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Abst ract - - In  1999, Liaw proposed a new broadcasting cryptosystem, which requires smaller band- 
width as compared to the previously proposed broadcasting cryptosystems. However, this article will 
show that the proposed system is insecure enough by presenting a conspiracy attack on it. We 
will also point out some ambiguous problems in Liaw's paper. Moreover, we propose an improved 
broadcasting cryptosystem, which is a slight modification of the proposed system to overcome the 
conspiracy attack. © 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Communication techniques have encouraged the distribution of information. How to establish 
secure and efficient communications among users over insecure computer networks is important. 
One of the important issues for achieving the aforementioned requirements is the development of 
the broadcasting cryptosystem. The broadcasting cryptosystem is that a sender can broadcast 
an encrypted message and only certain authorized subsets in the system can decrypt the message. 
Based upon cryptographic techniques, everal broadcasting cryptosystems [1-3] have been pro- 
posed. However, the previously proposed cryptosystems [1,2] need many broadcasting messages, 
and it is hard to insert new users into the system. To remedy the drawbacks, Liaw [3] proposed 
a new broadcasting cryptosystem based on the RSA scheme [4] and a symmetric cryptosystem 
(e.g., DES [5]). 
First, we will review and point out some ambiguous problems in Liaw's paper [3]. It is beneficial 
to read his paper. Moreover, one conspiracy attack is given in this paper to show that Liaw's 
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broadcasting cryptosystem is not secure enough. We are going to show that two users can 
collaborate to derive the secret key of the central authority server. In such cases, the secret keys 
of all users in the system will be also revealed. The two users can always decrypt any transmitted 
ciphertexts in the system, even though the transmitted messages are not authorized for them. 
Therefore, we also propose a slight modification of Liaw's broadcasting cryptosystem to enhance 
the level of security. 
2. REV IEW AND AMBIGUOUS PROBLEMS OF L IAW'S 
BROADCASTING SYSTEM 
Here, we review briefly Liaw's broadcasting cryptosystem. Meanwhile, we also point out some 
ambiguous problems in it. In the system, there is a central authority server (CAS for short). 
The CAS is responsible for generating the system parameters and the keys for all users Ui 
(i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n). Initially, the CAS secretly chooses two large strong primes p = 2p ' + 1 and 
q = 2q' + 1, where p' and q' are also primes [6,7], and then publishes N = pq. Define A(N) = 
Icm(p - 1, q - 1) and select a public key d such that ed - lmod ~(A(N)), where ~ denotes 
the Euler totient function [8] and e denotes the secret key of the system. Note that the above 
parameters have some slight modifications as compared to ones of the RSA system. Also, the 
CAS publishes a secure symmetric ryptosystem that E(.) is the encryption algorithm and D(.) 
is the corresponding decryption algorithm. Therefore, M = DMK(EMK(M)),  where MK is 
the encryption/decryption keyfor the symmetric ryptosystem. Then, the CAS selects a secret 
key K0 and computes each user Ui's secret keys ti and Ki, and the public key f(t i )  as follows: 
Ki = K~' modN, and f(t~) = t~, 
where each ti is a prime number selected by the CAS. Note that all ti are distinct odd primes 
and different from p' and q'. 
During the broadcasting encryption phase, without loss of generality, suppose that the sen- 
der U1 wants to broadcast a message M to the legitimate receivers U2, U3,. . . ,  Ua secretly, and 
Ua+l, Ua+2, • .-, Un are illegitimate receivers. U1 and CAS perform the following encryption steps 
to generate the ciphertext for M. 
STEP 1. U1 calls the CAS that he wants to broadcast a message to U2, U3,. . . ,  Ua. 
STEP 2. CAS computes two public keys f(B1) and PK1 as follows: 
B1 = t2 × t3 ×""  × ta, 
MK1 = K B~ mod N, 
f(B1) = B~, 
PK1 = Etl (MK1). 
STEP 3. Upon receiving f(B1) and PK1, U1 recovers MK1 = Dt l (PK1)and broadcasts the 
ciphertext C = EMK1 (M). 
As mentioned above, there is a matter needs to be cleared up. Is the public key f(t i )  equal 
to t e as an integer or t~ mod A(N)? If t e is computed in Z, the system is completely insecure 
for the following reason: An attacker can find the system's ecret key e and factor N, since d is 
public and he may find de - 1 which is multiple of A(N). Therefore, it must be t~ mod A(N). For 
the same reason, Bi and f (Bi)  are also to be reduced mod A(N). 
During the decryption phase, only the legitimate receivers Uj (j = 2, 3 , . . . ,  a) may obtain the 
message M after receiving f(B1) and C. Each legitimate receiver Uj uses his own secret key Kj 
to obtain the encryption/decryption keyMK1 by computing 74! f(B1)/l(tj))'L mod N. 
" -3  
Note that since Uj does not know A(N) and he must compute --K~ f(B~)/(f(t:'))'~ mod N, this will 
force d to be short. Otherwise, it is time-consuming. We suggest hat the size of d should be 16 
bits. Thus, this will not impair the security of the system [9]. 
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3. CRYPTANALYS IS  
In this section, we will show that any two users in Liaw's system can cooperatively derive the 
CAS's secret key K0 by the Euclidean algorithm [8]. Meanwhile, the secret key for each user in 
the system will also be revealed. 
Let U~ and Uy be two arbitrary users in the system. Since, the secret key Kx of Ux is computed 
by Kx -- K~" mod N, tx is also another secret key of U~. Because all ti are distinct odd primes 
and different from p~ and qP, it is obvious that tx of Ux and ty of Uy are relatively prime. 
Therefore, Ux and Uy can collude to find two numbers r and s that satisfy rtz + Sty -- 1 by the 
Euclidean algorithm. Thus, the CAS's secret key K0 can be computed as follows: 
r s rcrt~ ~CstcJ rcrtj+st~j K~K~modN =. ,o  ~'o " modN = ~'o modN = KomodN.  
In this case, the secret key Kj of each user Uj in the system can also be revealed by computing 
Kfo (tj)" modN = K~ '~' m°d A(N) modN = K~ J modN = Kj modN, 
where f(tj) = t~ modA(N) is the public key of Uj and d is the public key of CAS. 
As stated above, the proposed system is vulnerable to the conspiracy attack. That is, two 
cooperative users can always decrypt any transmitted ciphertexts in the system, even though 
they are not the legitimate receivers. 
4. MODIF ICAT IONS 
We have shown that Liaw's system is insecure. From the above cryptanalysis, we see that Ux 
and Uy can use their secret keys tx and ty to derive the CAS's secret key K0 cooperatively. 
Therefore, tx and ty should only be possessed by the CAS so that the secret key for each user Ui 
is only Ki. In such cases, Steps 2 and 3 in the broadcasting encryption phase need to be modified, 
and the other phases remain unchanged. The detailed modifications are presented as follows. 
*STEP 2. CAS computes two public keys f(B1) and PK1 as follows: 
B]  = t2 × t3 x . - .  × t~modA(N) ,  
MK1 = Ko sa mod N, 
f(bl) = B~ modA(N), 
PK1 = Exr~ (MK1). 
*STEP 3. Upon receiving f(B1) and PK1, U1 recovers MK1 = DK1 (PK1) and broadcasts the 
ciphertext C = EMK1 (M). 
During the decryption phase, each legitimate receiver Uj only adopts his own secret key Kj 
and public key f(tj) to obtain the encryption/decryption keyMK1 by computing KJ f(B1)/f(tD)'* 
mod N. In fact, we can see that the secret value tj for each user Uj in Liaw's system does not 
need to be possessed by each user Uj. 
5. D ISCUSSIONS 
In the improved system, although f(t~) = t e modA(N) is the public key of a user U,, an 
adversary or Ui does not know the value A(N), so that they cannot obtain ti. Since ti is unknown, 
any two users Ux and Uy cannot collude to derive the CAS's secret key /(0 by adopting the 
Euclidean algorithm to find two numbers r and s such that rtx + stx -- 1 as the cryptanalysis 
mentioned in Section 3. Therefore, the modified system not only retains the advantages of Liaw's 
system, but also prevents the conspiracy attack. 
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